Price Discrimination in Communication Networks
Main Article Content
Abstract
We study the best usage-based rating downside in an incredibly resource-constrained network
with one increasing service supplier and multiple teams of surplus-maximizing users. With the
idea that the service supplier is aware of the utility operate of every user (thus complete
information), we discover that the entire value differentiation theme can do an over sized
revenue gain (e.g., 50%) compared to no value differentiation, once the entire network resource
is comparably restricted and therefore the high-willingness-to-pay users are minorities.
However, the entire value differentiation theme could result in a high implementation quality. To
trade off the revenue against the implementation complexity; we tend to any study the partial
value differentiation theme and style a polynomial-time formula which will cipher the best
partial differentiation costs. We tend to additionally think about the unfinished data case
wherever the service supplier doesn't understand to that cluster every user belongs. We tend to
show that it's still doable to comprehend value differentiation beneath this situation and supply
the sufficient and necessary condition under that an incentive-compatible differentiation theme
can do similar revenue as beneath complete data.
Article Details
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
IJCERT Policy:
The published work presented in this paper is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license. This means that the content of this paper can be shared, copied, and redistributed in any medium or format, as long as the original author is properly attributed. Additionally, any derivative works based on this paper must also be licensed under the same terms. This licensing agreement allows for broad dissemination and use of the work while maintaining the author's rights and recognition.
By submitting this paper to IJCERT, the author(s) agree to these licensing terms and confirm that the work is original and does not infringe on any third-party copyright or intellectual property rights.
References
S. Li, J.Huang, and S-YR.Li, “Revenuemaximization for communication networks with usage-based pricing,” in
Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM,2009, pp. 1–6.
F. Kelly, “Charging and rate control for elastic traffic,” Eur. Trans. Telecommun., vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 33–37, 1997.
F. Kelly, A. Maulloo, and D. Tan, “Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional
fairness and stability,” J. Oper.Res. Soc., vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 237–252, 1998.[4] S. Low and D. Lapsley, “Optimization flow control: basic algorithm and convergence,” IEEE/ACMTrans.Netw.,
vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 861–874,Dec. 1999.
Basar, T. and Srikant R., “Revenue-maximizing pricing and capacity expansion in a many-users regime,”
Proceedings of INFOCOM, 2002.
Beckmann, M., Mcguire, C. B., and Winsten, C. B., Studies in the Economics of Transportation. Yale University
Press, 1956.
Correa, J. R., Schulz, A. S., and Stier Moses, N., “Selfish routing in capacitated networks,” Mathematics of
Operations Research, 29:4, pp. 961-976, Nov. 2004.
Dafermos, S. and Sparrow F. T., “The traffic assignment problem for a general network,” Journal of Research of
the National Bureau of Standards-B. Mathematical Sciences, vol. 73(2), pp.91-118, 1969.
Dasgupta, P. and Maskin E., “The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games. 2: Theory,”
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 53, pp. 1-26, 1986.
Friedman, E., “A Generic Analysis of Selfish Routing,”Proceedings of the 43rd IEEE Conference on Decision
and Control, 2004.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole J., Game Theory. The MIT Press,1991.
Harsanyi, J., “Games with Randomly Distributed Payoffs: a New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Points” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 1, pp. 1-23.
Hayrapetyan, A., Tardos, E., and Wexler T., “A network pricing game for selfish traffic,” Journal of
Distributed Computing,2005.
He, L. and Walrand, J., “Pricing internet services with multiple providers,” Proceedings of Allerton
Conference, 2003.
Huang, X., Ozdaglar, A., and Acemoglu, D., “Efficiency and Braess’ paradox under pricing in general
networks,” forthcoming JSAC Special issue: Price-Based Access Control and Economics for Communication
Networks.