Source Anonymity using multiple mixes in Packet Scheduling
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Abstract
-Secret communication, where users converse without revealing the personalities of communicating parties or the trails of data stream is critical in data networks. On the Internet, Chaum mixes, intermediate nodes, or proxy servers, which use coated encryption and packet shuffling techniques to hide source identities, are used to provide anonymity to network users. In this analysis, an information theoretic structure is developed to study the maximum anonymity possible by packet shuffling when the merges are memory restricted—in other words, they can store a finite number of packets. Network of mixes over receiving packet sources from an eavesdropper’s perspective as the measure of secrecy, the maximum achievable secrecy of a single mix with buffer size b (packets which contains the source and destination details of itself ) serving for achieving multiple mixes (network of mixes). By obtaining network of mixes the source anonymity is achieved successfully. For a general multiuser system, the maximum anonymity as buffer size b→∞ is shown to approach the entropy of the source arrival probabilities at a convergence rate no less significant than 1/b2 . When the arrival probabilities of the general multiuser system can be expressed as a rational portion k/2 n for some fixed n, this union rate is shown to be achievable. The secrecy analysis is extended to a common network of mixes linking the sources to multi destination, where the source secrecy achievable on the target link is shown to be lower enclosed by a weighted sum of the secrecy achievable by each individual mix
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