We study the best usage-based rating downside in an incredibly resource-constrained network with one increasing service supplier and multiple teams of surplus-maximizing users. With the idea that the service supplier is aware of the utility operate of every user (thus complete information), we discover that the entire value differentiation theme can do an over sized revenue gain (e.g., 50%) compared to no value differentiation, once the entire network resource is comparably restricted and therefore the high-willingness-to-pay users are minorities. However, the entire value differentiation theme could result in a high implementation quality. To trade off the revenue against the implementation complexity; we tend to any study the partial value differentiation theme and style a polynomial-time formula which will cipher the best partial differentiation costs. We tend to additionally think about the unfinished data case wherever the service supplier doesn't understand to that cluster every user belongs. We tend to show that it's still doable to comprehend value differentiation beneath this situation and supply the sufficient and necessary condition under that an incentive-compatible differentiation theme can do similar revenue as beneath complete data.

B.Asha Singh,M.Sri Lakshmi,Dr.S.Prem Kumar."Price Discrimination in Communication Networks". International Journal of Computer Engineering In Research Trends (IJCERT) ,ISSN:2349-7084 ,Vol.1, Issue 01,pp.30-36, July - 2014, URL :https://ijcert.org/ems/ijcert_papers/P5.pdf,

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